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ABSTRACT: This article aims at analyzing the recent mutations of the Breton repertoire of contention. To 
do so, it proposes to look at the example of an association called “Dibab”, which praised participatory 
democracy by organizing local votes on nationalitarian topics in small Breton towns during the year of 
2015. Having a look at the trajectory of Dibab activists shows that many of them had started their militant 
career years ago, and were familiar to more radical pro-independence organizations. How do these activ-
ists have managed to play with different political strategies without losing their ideological frames? How 
have they expressed different kinds of commitment through their political practices and discourses? Ob-
servations, document studies and semi-structured biographical interviews disclose that the construction 
of a new participatory ideal by radical Breton activists does not prevent them from being multipositioned 
in the militant field, widening their action spectrum by doing so. That is why the Breton repertoire is 
better understood as a continuum. Indeed, long term processes and the juxtaposition of different spaces 
of mobilization must be taken into account in  the analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
During the summer of 2014, about fifteen1 left-wing Breton activists launched an as-
sociation called Dibab (“choice” in Breton).  The organization then organized a series of 
advisory local votes, targeting inhabitants of twenty small rural towns. The locals were 
asked to answer whether they would support the territorial “reunification” and political 
autonomy of Brittany or not. One year later, in November 2015, confronted with decreas-
ing participation and the defection of many of its members and supporters, the associa-
tion was put into dormancy.   
Dibab’s campaigners were also long-time political activists. Six of them were 
simultaneously members of center-left parties like Europe Écologie Les Verts (EÉLV) (two 
members) or Union Démocratique Bretonne (UDB) (four), but most of them (officially 
ten) belonged to Breizhistance, a radical left-wing ethno-regionalist organization. 
 The latter is known in Brittany for having replaced another party, Emgann (“combat”) 
in 2009, after Emgann suffered from social disqualification. The reason for this were the 
presumed sympathies of Emgann campaigners with political violence. Indeed, some of 
its members were suspected to have played a role in the bombing of Quévert on the 14th 
april 2000, until they were exonerated by justice. 
A former Emgann activist writes 15 years later that Dibab is the expression of “active 
Breton democracy2”. Praising the values of citizen participation may seem quite 
surprising at first sight coming from people claiming themselves to be radically against 
the state institutions. Which social mechanisms allowed Breizhistance activists to convert 
themselves to the practice of “votation” and what does it reveal about the mutations of 
the contemporary Breton repertoire of contention? 
Participatory democracy practices such as unofficial local referendums3 have recently 
emerged as new strategies for nationalitarian4 movements: Basque activists created the 
Batera platform in 2002, demanding more autonomy for the French Basque country, 
while Catalan independence campaigners organized a self-ruled independence 
referendum in 2014, which was declared illegal by the Spanish government, leading to 
the political events of 2017. However, this democratic turn has not been subject to much 
research in the field of regionalism and nationalism studies yet. 
 
1 I will give more details later about how complex it was to count the activists, given that the participation 
in Dibab was often volatile. 
2 “Dibab, c’est la démocratie bretonne en marche”, he writes in a programmatical book published in 2015. 
3 Called “votations” in French. 
4 Contraction between “nationalism” and “minoritary” (Kernalegenn, 2005). 
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In that respect, the Breton case is remarkable in Western Europe. First, it is less visible 
than other textbook cases within the nationalist and regionalist spectrum, like Wales or 
Scotland. Secondly, the Breton movement takes place in a specific territorial 
organization, the centralized French Nation-State inherited from the French Revolution. 
This centralist ethos lets local government exists only insofar as a Nation-State rule allows 
it to, which raises tensions between local arrangements (like in Alsace or Corsica) and the 
French territorial ideology. In the French context, the Corsican and Basque cases appear 
to be more influential on decision-making than the militant Breton configuration. 
Besides, their history with political violence is less marginal than in Brittany, which the 
peace process of June 2015 in the French Basque country accounts for. 
If the Breton nationalitarian5 revival in the “1968 years” (Fillieule and al., 2018) 
disclosed an assertive connection between different spaces for mobilization, like 
environmental demonstrations, protests for social justice, and linguistic claims 
(Kernalegenn, 2005), this regional tradition of mobilization has decreased today, as 
specific regionalist demands have gradually been taken into account starting from the 
late 1970's (Kernalegenn, 2018). However, diffuse regionalist ideas keep playing a role in 
the Breton political balance of power, as part of a large register of resilience 
(Offerlé, 2008) in Brittany. 
On this political scene, Dibab is a modest, rather confidential participatory experience, 
although its founders claim to be inspired by Scottish and Catalan separatist processes. 
As an expression of “quiet politics” (Culpepper, 2010), this case is highly emblematic of 
the latest tensions and patterns of renewal within the Breton repertoire of contention. 
In that sense, the use of the microscope (Sawicki, 2000) helps the researcher to have a 
more comprehensive view on the big picture. 
 
Theoretical background: 
This article will refer to sociological studies of political violence (Nieburg, 1969, Som-
mier, 1998, Sommier, 2013, Créttiez and Sommier, 2012), following their ambition to de-
specify the social concept of violence in the general spectrum of dynamics of contention, 
and in relation with the model of participation.  
 
5 « Nationalitarian » is a translation of the French adjective « nationalitaire ». « Nationalitaire » is a contrac-
tion of « national » and « minoritaire », referring to national minorities in France. The expression is used by 
French sociologist Michel Bassand to describe « movements which we shall call ‘nationalitarian’ to differen-
tiate them from the 19th-century nationalist movements. They are based on a search for identity, a more 
or less clearly defined desire for autonomy and sécession and the questioning of a given social order, gen-
erally Nation-States. » (Bassand, 1975 : 1). Considering that this research takes place in a French context, I 
will use this term rather than the more general « ethno-national ». 
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I propose to question the social effects of nationalitarian political violence on the col-
lective trajectory of the radical independentist left, on the other organizations of the 
Breton movement, as well as on the effects on the relations between them all. 
Exploring the dynamics of engagement, I will pay attention to activist careers under-
stood as processual tools. Indeed, the Chicago school-inherited concept of career has the 
advantage of taking both structures and strategies into account (Darmon, 2008). I intend 
to follow Muriel Darmon’s use of careers as sociological tools to stand guard against the 
phenomena of “biographical illusion” (Bourdieu, 1986) in the informants’ discourses. The 
notion of biographical illusion is also relevant with regards to Annie Collovald and Brigitte 
Gaïtti's continuity hypothesis (“hypothèse de continuité”) (Collovald and Gaïti, 2006 in 
Fillieule, 2012), explaining that social actors experience their career exits as part of a 
logical progression of positions occupied in the social space. This hypothesis allows 
(de-)mobilized individuals to experience their exits more easily by creating consistency, 
if not in their biographies, at least in their narratives. 
Focusing more specifically on the case of former Emgann activists who participated in 
Dibab in 2014, the article asks to what extent these trajectories embody a “repertorial” 
turn in the Breton movement6. Researchers often assume that after the failure of political 
violence in Brittany, many activists turned to the cultural sphere rather than maintaining 
a strictly political activity (Créttiez, Sommier, 2002). Nevertheless, my study focuses on 
actors who kept positioning themselves in the field of what is perceived and constructed 
as specifically political (Arnaud, Guionnet, 2005), thus reformulating the modalities of 
this positioning. Career exits or perpetuations will hence be studied in relation to the 
different sociological definitions of “de-radicalization” (Cronin, 2006, Sommier, 2013) and 
radicalness. The latter being often used as a normative label, I will also pay attention to 
des-identification phenomena (Goffman, 1963) performed by the activists. 
The persistence of a political engagement after the decline of radical methods will be 
looked into with the help of Rosabeth Moss Kanter's concept of commitment (Moss Kan-
ter, 1972). In her case study about communities and communes, Rosabeth Moss Kanter 
asks the following question: how can commitment – an important but under-researched 
concept- be built and maintained? (Moss Kanter, 1972 : VIII). She defines commitment 
as a phenomenon situated “at the intersection between the organizational requisites of 
groups and the personal orientations and preferences of their members” (Moss Kanter, 
1972 : 66). 
 
6 Traditionally called “Emsav” by researchers (Nicolas, 2012) as well as many activists. Both words will be 
used in the article. 
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Commitment is a powerful mechanism that drives the actors into investing their time, 
energy and affects to maintain a group. It also explains why certain militant groups do 
not disappear but transform and adapt themselves to a changing context. Such resilient 
groups have been called abeyance structures by the American political scientist Verta 
Taylor, who looked at the renaissance of the feminist movement in the United States in 
the 1960’s after a period of discretion (Taylor, 1989). Indeed, she describes the trajectory 
of a feminist network which, when in shutdown, tends to retract and value private prac-
tices more than political ones. Affective economy mechanisms allow the group to survive 
before coming back to the political arena several years later, without having deeply mod-
ified its constitution. 
This attention paid to affects and to the economy they engender within activist groups 
leads us to also consider the concept of moral economy of protest (Thompson, 1963, 
Scott, 1976). First mentioned by E. Thompson to evaluate the importance of norms and 
values in the rebellions of socially dominated groups, traditionally viewed through the 
only prism of materialism, the concept was then widened by James Scott in order to ex-
plain the emergence of subjectivity in social conflicts and give political credit to the 
“weapons of the weak”. This concept is useful to explore the moral universes of the ac-
tivists, and to apprehend the different steps of their careers with regards to their tensions 
and contradictions. 
The norms and values of a society constitute a constraint that weighs on the protest-
ers’ repertoires of contention. Repertoires have been defined by Charles Tilly as the set 
of various protest-related tools and actions available to a movement or related organiza-
tion in a given time frame (Tilly, 2008). He distinguishes two major repertoires of conten-
tion regarding the evolution of protest in France from the 17th century to today. The first 
repertoire of contention is characterized by the investment of local spaces and by the 
recourse to local authority figures. The second repertoire is organized at the national 
scale and is rather emancipated from traditional authorities and temporalities. A poster-
ity for this typology can be found in Michel Offerlé’s study of the repertoire of employers. 
Moreover, Michel Offerlé invites us to consider the international circulation of reper-
toires of contention, which is heuristic in the case of regionalist claims. 
 
 
Research methodology: 
The political organizations to which Dibab members belonged did not exist as such in 
2000, apart from the UDB. That is why four biographical semi-structured interviews with 
Dibab activists also part of Breizhistance are the main source of this study, as 
Breizhistance carries the Emgann inheritance in the Breton movement today 
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(Nicolas, 2012). These activists are the best placed to have been touched by the reper-
cussions of violent activism in Brittany. They have thus found several ways of handling its 
social memory in their militant careers. I also conducted other interviews with (three) 
members of the UDB (ethno-regionalist left), Europe Écologie Les Verts (EÉLV) (French 
Green party) (one), Parti Breton (PB) (ethno-regionalist right) (one), Breizh Europa 
(ethno-regionalist center-right, scission of the PB) (one). The member of the PB encoun-
tered was also a participant in the Bonnets Rouges movement, a group created after the 
French government’s attempt to initiate a new tax on transport-induced pollution. These 
interviews with secondary actors helped me sketching a more complete picture of 
Dibab's direct political environment and understanding the connections of Dibab with 
the larger landscape of Breton activism. Moreover, several observations were carried out 
during demonstrations, public meetings and votes organized by activists. This fieldwork 
study regarding Dibab was part of a wider empirical research about reunification of Brit-
tany, that is why I conducted fieldwork between September 2014 and May 2016. Within 
this period, Dibab was only active during a year (September 2014 - November 2015). 
Some interviews with activists were therefore conducted after the platform was put into 
dormancy. 
 
 By questioning the trajectory of the Dibab platform, the goal of this article is to 
retrace the conditions for the production of a renewed Breton activism, aimed at embrac-
ing a new type of legitimacy based on participation. 
 
After having examined militant trajectories marked by a dialectic relationship between 
radicalness and de-radicalization, I will move on to the construction of an “exemplary” 
repertory of contention by activists willing to reconfigure their relation to institutions.  
Then, the trends of continuity at the core of this collective trajectory will be highlighted. 
 
 
2. Discontinuous trajectories, late militant recompositions 
 
Sociologists like Xavier Créttiez and Isabelle Sommier (Créttiez and Sommier, 2002) re-
fer to the repertoire of regionalist protest movements in French territories – Corsica, 
Basque country - as a violent one. They reproach its participants of sometimes confound-
ing identity and violence (Créttiez and Sommier, 2002 : 27). I propose to question the 
category of violence by re-situating it in its social context and in relation with other 
modes of operation. Harold Leonard Nieburg explains that no violence is political per se: 
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only its social effects are political (Nieburg, 1969). It is thus only a posteriori that political 
violence can be analyzed. 
In Brittany, the 1990s were marked by the transition from what Xavier Créttiez and 
Isabelle Sommier describe as “goodwill terrorism” (“terrorisme bienveillant”) (Créttiez 
and Sommier, 2002), characterized by a misdirected anticipation of the supervising and 
policing measures, to more substantial risk taking and professionalization of the activism. 
This mutation of political violence was characterized by the organizational change of the 
concerned groups. The rather unstructured Front de Libération de la Bretagne7 (FLB) 
moved up to hardened activism with the creation of the Armée Révolutionnaire Bretonne 
(ARB). This process reached boiling point at the end of the 1990s with the case of the 
Plévin explosives. Numerous Breton activists were arrested, suspected to have provided 
logistical help to a Basque commando of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna8 (ETA) (Nicolas, 2012). 
The cycle of violence was interrupted in the aftermath of the Quévert case. In this 
bombing on a Mac Donald’s restaurant in Quévert on April 19th, 2000, a young employee 
of the restaurant died. Athough no organization claimed responsibility for this event, 
suspicion weighed on the ARB.  First, the justice system credited the ARB for the bombing 
during the processing of the “Attentats Bretagne” file. This file covers the 1993-2000 
period and examines several cases of pro-independence political violence in order to find 
potential connections between them. A first study of the file results in the incarceration 
of several Emgann activists, including the party’s spokesperson. Because of its porosity 
with the ARB, the political party Emgann was heavily marginalized after the bombing, 
and some of its leaders' pre-trial custodies lasted several years. During an interview, a 
Dibab activist who joined Emgann in 2000 explains: “I arrived just when Quévert 
occurred, a complicated time, but in this way, I learned a lot, this complicated context 
formed me in a militant way, it is clear. It means we supported the prisoners, we knew 
that struggle was a thing that could bring us to jail. Then what happens is that Emgann 
focused on the support for prisoners: you have almost all the political bureau in jail.” 
Likewise, a former Emgann activist, now a Breizhistance member, insists on the role 
played by the defense of the accused in the demands of the radical Breton left of the 
2000's : “so, and then it was the CARB, mostly, the Coordination Anti-Répressive de 
Bretagne, the defence of Breton political prisoners”. 
Pro-independence left-wing activists tended to reorientate their activities mostly for 
practical reasons: they had no time left for activism other than supporting their 
 
7 The Front de Libération de la Bretagne (FLB) was a Breton group which committed several bombings from 
1966 to 1971, praising independence of the territory. 
8 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) was an armed organisation claiming the independence of Basque country, 
officially dissolved in 2018 
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comrades in jail. This changing field of action participated in a pragmatical de-radicaliza-
tion process. Indeed, an organizational turn to new operatory modalities is one of the 
conditions for deradicalization as underlined by Audrey Cronin (Cronin, 2006 in Sommier, 
2013). The others are the arrest of the organization’s leaders, the decline of popular sup-
port, the relative failure of the founders to hand over the organization to potential suc-
cessors and the importance of targeted repression. Furthermore, the possibilities of a 
“soft” exit for radical activists, like the opening of a negotiation phase with the authori-
ties or a political victory cannot be envisaged for Emgann, considering the toughening of 
nationalitarian violence in Brittany, and of the increasingly repressive apparatus targeting 
the activists. As Doug Mac Adam notices, the logics of high-risk engagement are not dif-
ferent from the ones of more common forms of engagement (Mac Adam, 1987, in Som-
mier, 2013). It is thus the latter that produces the former. Therefore, the Breton mobili-
zation should be examined with attention to activists’ careers as well as the broader mu-
tations of the political context in Brittany. 
The liberation of incarcerated activists once found innocent of the crime 
reconfigurated their type of commitment. How do they perceive their exit from a 
hardened activism strongly shaped by repression? If Emgann condemned the Quévert 
attack, the left-wing campaigners for independence were not the only ones to be marked 
by the incident. With the end of nationalitarian violence in Brittany, activists got 
(self-)reflexive about the changeover of a political structure to another, has shown by 
Isabelle Sommier: “One has to note that the progress of the protestation cycle can be 
followed in successive repositionings of the ones and the others with regards to violence, 
it is also and by the rereading of the latter that it finishes9” (Sommier, 1998: 16). 
The reflexiveness of Breton activists regarding violence and its social effects has con-
tributed to redefining the place of the organizations in militant spaces. It has also affected 
discourses held by the organizations and their members in the medium term, as well as 
discourses that external groups produce about the Emsav. During our field research, 
mentioning the question of political violence in Brittany was not easy, and resulted in a 
few reactions from the informants who were reluctant to put into words episodes of vi-
olence and repression that could have heavily affected their biographies. However, these 
processes built a backdrop that unfolded all along the field research. 
Although this part of Breton history may be heavy to carry, it does not automatically 
prejudice the Emsav activists: sometimes it even rewards them. Indeed, while question-
ing representatives in different towns where Dibab votes have been organized, we found 
 
9 « Il faut noter que si le déroulement du cycle de contestation peut être suivi au gré des repositionnements 
successifs des uns et des autres vis-à-vis de la violence, c’est aussi dans et par la relecture de celle-ci qu’il 
s’achève. » (Sommier, 1998 : 16) 
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that some local representatives fully supported the participatory democratic procedure 
put forwards by the activists they had met, using the argument that “[they] prefer people 
to spend their time organizing local votes rather than setting bombs in Mac Donald’s10”. 
A kind of moral agreement thus guarantees the proper functioning of this common work 
between local representatives and radical activists. As long as it works, the moral econ-
omy in which Dibab votes take place is protected. This repertoire change of independ-
ence campaigners is hence lauded by a part of the institutional political field.  
To promote Dibab, radical left-wing independence campaigners often work with 
elected representatives of different political hues, only a minority belonging to parties of 
the Emsav. Within the platform itself, the Breizhistance campaigners interact with the 
more moderate ones of the UDB and of EÉLV - the latter having the particularity of being 
organized at the national French scale, not without internal tensions11 sometimes. More-
over, Breizhistance activists, who cultivate a revolutionary type of militant praxis tend to 
import it into Dibab. Dibab’s spokesperson explains for instance: “for me, a rather so-
called revolutionary activist, I don’t forget that comrades of mine die across the world, 
get tortured while they act, and so on, so the energy I spend acting, I know that it has 
nothing to do with the actions other comrades across the world use in their struggle, so 
it means an important commitment. And this, however, I know all of us do not share the 
same vision of militant commitment within Dibab and that it sometimes brings certain 
frictions, but then, they are clearly surmountable”. 
The degree of appropriation of the platform varied depending on the political party of 
the activists. Surprisingly enough, activists whose ideological convictions were far from 
Dibab’s rhetoric -compared to UDB or EÉLV members- were the ones who invest the most 
energy in the organization of votes. Although Breizhistance members were not familiar 
to participatory techniques, they were deeply committed to Dibab and did not hesitate 
to dedicate a non-negligeable amount of time and energy to their cause. On the contrary, 
EÉLV and UDB activists cultivated a more distanced approach, although they claimed to 
admire the commitment and discipline of their Breizhistance partners.  
In that respect, I divided Dibab activists into three circles. Ten activists at the begin-
ning, less than five at the end made up the very core of Dibab. This first circle supervised 
all the local votes and the communication work. They were intensely invested in the as-
sociation, ready to leave the partisan field behind to organize more votes, of which they 
 
10 Interview with the mayor of a town which hosted a Dibab poll. 
11 A Breizhistance activist tells for instance that when a member of the UDB came to help them canvassing 
in their town, tensions quickly arose. “It is where we saw the difference”, she explains. “G. did the campaign 
with them, at the end of the day, he could not anymore, he said: “he had to stop talking, he was only saying 
bullshit!” 
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expected a lot. These activists mainly came from Breizhistance, but also a little bit from 
the UDB. The second circle was constituted of activists who did not participate in the 
genesis of Dibab but offered some of their time at a given moment to prepare the votes 
and animate the meetings. Activists of the second circle all suspended their associative 
activity in September 2015 to start working on the electoral campaign12 of their respec-
tive political parties, UDB and EÉLV. The third circle included Breizhistance members or 
sympathizers who occasionally helped organizing a vote as a service to their comrades, 
without truly believing in the participatory practice or investing themselves in the asso-
ciation. 
This overinvestment of Breizhistance campaigners can also be explained by political 
reasons: at the launching of Dibab, Breizhistance was going through a phase of difficul-
ties, with little mobilization of its members and no electoral perspective. The new politi-
cal initiative was seized by the activists as a way to reconvert their militant capital (Ma-
tonti, Poupeau, 2004) at limited costs. But their tight commitment also brought them 
symbolic retributions (Gaxie, 1977) that Dibab activists from EÉLV or the UDB were less 
socialized to obtain. Indeed, Breizhistance activists, especially former Emgann members 
can be compared to the communes and communities analyzed by Rosabeth Moss Kanter 
(Moss Kanter, 1972). In these groups, committed people are willing to do what the struc-
ture demands, even ‒ and maybe especially ‒ if it requires a high degree of renunciation 
to other relationships or activities: “when a person is committed, what he wants to do 
(through internal feeling) is the same as what he has to do (according to external de-
mands), and thus he gives to the group what it needs to maintain itself as the same time 
that he gets what he needs to nourish his own sense of self” (Moss Kanter, 1972 : 66-67). 
In that sense, radical left-wing activists constitute a collective entity characterized by a 
specific moral economy (Thompson, 1963; Scott, 1976) which infuses its actions with 
moral bases. 
 
 
3. The costly construction of an “exemplary” repertoire 
  
As a major frame of reference in public policies since the 1990s, participatory democ-
racy refers to all the consultative or deliberative processes summoning the “citizen” to 
give their opinion on one project or another. French political scientist Rémi Lefebvre 
writes : “Under the “local participatory democracy” label, procedures, techniques, and 
unequally important proceedings, punctual or permanent, which share the common goal 
 
12 On the 6th and 13th December 2015, regional elections took place in all the French regions. 
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to essentially “associate” citizens to political decision-making13” (Lefebvre in Pasquier 
and al. 2011 : 157). Without offering an alternative to the current representative system, 
participation can tend to deconflictualize local politics, by constantly searching for con-
sensus (Neveu, 2011). One can consider it as a modern version of the weberian notion 
of exemplarity (Weber 1996 in Renou and al., 2018), which describes the practice of a 
demanding life potentially leading to salvation. Envisioned as an “alternative way for 
politicization”, exemplarity can be applied to diffuse and be socially perceived as moral 
ways to do politics: one must set an example for the others. Then, even political oppo-
nents to nationalitarian thematics carried by Dibab could not but praise the civic aspect 
of the process. 
It is not only in the 2000’s-2010’s that the Breton repertoire has fluctuated between 
collective protest and institutionalization of its organizations and their members. Indeed, 
at the turn of the 1980s one can also observe a phase of professionalization for activists 
who had begun their militant career in the previous decade. Indeed, the progressive spe-
cialization and increasing legitimization of militant organizations affects their discourses 
(Kernalegenn, 2018). As mentioned, when the social context becomes unfavorable, the 
Breton movement turns to a more diffuse kind of activism, for instance by supporting 
the development of immersive Breton schools. This repertorial turn can be considered 
as part of an abeyance process where committed activists do not give up on their prac-
tices or beliefs when the outside context gets more hostile, but set up mechanisms of 
resilience such as the promotion of interpersonal affective ties which help the group to 
reappear on the political scene years later. Rosabeth Moss Kanter's explains: “a cohesive 
group has strong emotional bonds and can withstand threats to its existence; members 
"stick together" “(Moss Kanter, 1972 : 69). The tighter the commitment binds its partici-
pants together, the longer the group can last. 
During the decade between 1990-2000, armed struggle became progressively marked 
with social illegitimacy in Brittany, while new frames of reference started to establish 
themselves in political life, such as the search for proximity (Le Bart and Lefebvre, 2005), 
or participatory democracy. As reckoned by David Snow and Robert Benford (Snow and 
Benford, 1988), the success of a framing process depends on its capacity to resonate with 
the cultural ground in which it unfolds. Keeping its political capacity (Pasquier, 2004) as 
a structure requires adaptation to the expectations of Breton society. This new discursive 
repertoire inscribes itself in a mutation of the militant moral economy (Thompson, 
1963 ; Scott, 1976) of the Breton movement. Participation has then become a new norm 
 
13 « Sous le label « démocratie participative locale » coexistent des procédures, des techniques et des dé-
marches d’inégale importance, ponctuelles ou permanente, dont l’objectif commun est d’« associer » de 
manière générale les citoyens à la prise de décision politique » (Lefèbvre in Pasquier and al., 2011 : 157). 
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and value which weighs on the activists' decisions regarding the repertoire of contention 
they may use. 
The 2010s were years of unitary militant work for the radical pro-independence left. 
At that time, Breizhistance talked the rest of the Emsav into working on different collec-
tive projects. The goal was to put forward linguistic, territorial and autonomy claims on 
the political Breton scene. It is in this way that L'Appel de Pontivy (“the Call of Pontivy”) 
was produced and signed by ethno-regionalist partisan and associative organizations 
covering a large political spectrum (from extreme-left to moderate right organizations): 
Breizhistance, Ai'Ta, EÉLV Bretagne, Kevre Breizh, Mouvement Bretagne et Progrès, Parti 
Breton, UDB and 44=Breizh. Although it led to the creation of the platform “Libérons les 
énergies en Bretagne!” (“Free energies in Brittany!”), nothing concrete was organized in 
the aftermath to keep this platform going. By being progressively more open on other 
militant perspectives, getting to work with activists with different social trajectories, rad-
ical activists have widened their values systems, reshaping the moral economy that 
bound them. 
“I insist on claiming that the pro-independence left claim the paternity for equally 
Dibab and the Call of Pontivy. This has clearly been the continuation of the observations 
we could conduct in Catalonia”, declares a Breizhistance activist, revealing thereafter the 
importance of the international circulation of repertoires of contention (Offerlé, 2008) 
between nationalitarian movements in Western Europe. It is therefore meaningful that 
the participatory practice of local vote was implemented by my informants in 2014. 
In effect, 2014 was a pivotal year for nationalitarian European movements. On the 18th 
of September 2014, the referendum on Scottish independence was held. As mentioned, 
on the 9th of November of the same year, Catalonian independentists launched a self-
organized vote on independence, non-recognized by the Spanish State. It is also in the 
French Basque country that Dibab initiators found an inspiration in the unitary “plat-
form” called Batera (“together”), created in 2002. One of its activities consisted in locally 
consulting the citizens by installing unofficial voting stations outside official ones during 
regional elections of 2010, with the support of 90 mayors. Therefore, it is no wonder that 
Dibab members emphasized their international inspirations in their communication for 
the general public, as shown by a flyer inviting people to attend the association’s launch-
ing meeting: “democratic experiences in Scotland, Catalan countries, the Basque coun-
try… and Brittany?”. 
The weight of international or inter-regional observations has contributed to the cre-
ation of coherence in the use of participatory technologies shaped by a citizen and civic 
discourse for activists whose ideology encourages total rupture with the institutions of 
representative democracy, market and state. Moreover, the year 2014 inscribed regional 
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issues on the national political agenda with the government project of a territorial reform 
redrawing the regions. The premises of this reform drove the Emsav organizations into a 
strong militant investment characterized both by unitary initiatives, such as three 
demonstrations organized in Nantes in 2014, and attempts to differentiate themselves 
with new projects like Dibab. This cycle of contention (Tarrow, 1988) resurrected the old 
Emsav wish to re-unify the official Breton territory by adding the department of Loire-
Atlantique to it. In the summer of 2014, the Emsav was split between two strategies. For 
the center and the right of the movement, the best way to proceed is to apply pressure 
on local representatives whereas left-wing groups prefer to hold local votes on this topic. 
The activists' adjustment to the constraint of exemplarity is thus to analyze in the wider 
context of national and international political structure of political opportunities.   
Nevertheless, this favorable background for transmission of militant technologies does 
not mean that regionalist movements can be simply transferred from a European region 
to another, one particularity of regionalisms being precisely their will to defend unique 
characteristics of a territory and its inhabitants. During the interviews, not all activists 
agreed on the advantages of comparing their movement to Catalan or Scottish ones. 
However, they had the same opinion concerning the perverse effects of a too strict com-
parison between Catalonia and Brittany: “We are not at all in the same ratio of power 
regarding Catalonia, it is so far from us”, explains A. “We cannot be compared to what 
we take example from”, says J. However, results won by the Catalans to their self-ruled 
referendum are well perceived by Dibab members. 
For Breizhistance campaigners, endorsing a militant role shaped by a participative illu-
sio can rather be described as an identity dissonance than as a logical follow-up of posi-
tions. However, individual reconversions are experienced as part of a long-time commit-
ment more than as biographical ruptures. Therefore, it is not certain at all that Dibab 
campaigners coming from Emgann and Breizhistance perceived their trajectory differ-
ently than in a linear way, confirming Annie Collovald and Brigitte Gaïtti’s continuity hy-
pothesis (Collovald and Gaïti, 2006 in Fillieule, 2012). However, there was on their part a 
will to “des-identify” themselves from their independentist label, which has only little 
social legitimacy or audibility. In this way, the choice of the participatory register by Dibab 
functioned like a desidentification marker (Goffman, 1963) for these activists concerned 
about getting rid of their categorization as extreme-left independence campaigners. 
Difficulties in keeping up with consistency and operating identity negotiations were 
not the only hurdles met by the activists. They also suffer from double binds from militant 
organizations. Binds that are put on them as individual actors inserted in a plurality of 
social spaces. “It is clear that we are in a kind of compromise, of course. Otherwise, we 
would have organized votes about “do you want a free and socialist Brittany?”” asserts 
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Dibab’s spokesperson, also a Breizhistance activist. During observations and interview 
situations, the most radical militants, even too young to have participated in Emgann, 
did not hesitate to express their reservations regarding participation techniques. 
Once the vote in Saint-Herblain - the biggest town to host a Dibab vote - was over, one 
of its organizers got out of the voting station and yelled with resentment: “once again, it 
is not today that we will free Brittany!”. The participation rate in Saint-Herblain, one of 
the last towns where Dibab organized a vote, was only 3%, whereas the first Dibab vote 
had got 26%14 of the locals inscribed on electoral lists to vote (in the small town of Saint-
Viaud). Although the desire of distancing himself from the public discourse of the Dibab 
association was clear, it was not expressed that easily during interviews. This discrepancy 
shows that conflict within Dibab was never violent nor open but resulted in latent ten-
sions to which the activists responded by setting up individual mechanisms of resistance 
to disappointment (Fillieule, 2005). 
Since the recent social history of Emgann is hard to put into words for the informants, 
mechanisms of dissonance were shut down or understated during conversations with 
the researcher. It is often the members of other parties than Breizhistance, like the UDB, 
who disclose the different methods used by their pro-independence comrades: “ You see, 
for example, F., he had bumped into a journalist who covered Notre-Dame-des-Landes15. 
When she saw him doing that, she had seen him six months ago throwing cobblestones 
on cops, and six months after that, he is organizing votes in a small town with the mayor, 
she says to him: but you settled down, you grew up! ”. 
In that respect, the impossibility of collecting direct discourses regarding the uses of 
politically violent strategies sheds light on a real methodological hurdle for the re-
searcher, also revealing the social discredit of different levels of political violence today 
in Brittany. 
 
 
4. A repertorial continuum. Reformulating nationalitarian activism. 
 
First, Isabelle Sommier (2013) has remarked that de-radicalization processes can be 
diverse and do not necessarily happen simultaneously. For that reason, an individual or 
an organization can de-redicalize their ways of action (by renouncing to the use of polit-
ical violence, for instance) without abandoning their ideological radicalness. In a 
 
14 Participation rates were summed up in a chart online on their website Dibab.bzh, and then removed 
from it. 
15 Town in the department of  Loire-Atlantique which was characterised by a political conflict between op-
ponents and partisans of an airport project finally abandoned in 2017. 
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fluctuating political context, actors tend to replace radical registers of action by hardened 
ideological frames (Sommier, 2013). “I remain deeply anti-capitalist, deeply independen-
tist”, asserts a Breizhistance and Dibab member. Militant multipositionings of the inform-
ants explain the absence of these two ideological features inside the Dibab program. “We 
have invented the plurality of associative offices” summarized a Dibab activist, also a 
trade union activist and 2015 regional elections candidate. 
It is indeed through other militant organizations that activists put into words and into 
action their social project for the reunified and autonomous Brittany they wish to see. In 
that respect, Dibab activists were also members of one or several other collectives, 
whether it is trade unions ‒ the French Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) or the 
Breton Sindikad Labourerien Breizh (SLB, “Breton workers union”) ‒, ad hoc collectives 
created for a specific mobilization – mobilization against territory planning projects for 
instance – or political parties, as mentioned. The activists thus used classical methods of 
the workers movement in France (demonstrations, strikes) when they appeared under 
the label of a political party like Breizhistance, whereas their actions and interventions in 
Dibab were strictly confined to the participatory register. 
When I mentioned the possibility that potential Dibab “voters” might be curious of 
Dibab members’ political opinions, an activist told me that he would postpone these 
questions to an ulterior moment of sociability. It is after the public speech that the polit-
ical project of each activist is evoked, preferably over a drink. “What matters is really to 
make them understand there is a space where we stand as Dibab, and a space where we 
are out of Dibab, and there, we do whatever we want”, he declared. 
Within the same theme, the reunification of Brittany, a range of strategies can be un-
folded by the same individuals, in different places and at different times, according to 
the different groups to which they belong. It is in this way that an independence activist 
justified their participation in Dibab: “to me, it was rather that, it was talking about it in 
different manners”. Although there was a generational difference within the platform-
between Emgann former members or sympathizers and younger Breizhistance members, 
it did not match a clear line between the ones who would want to des-identify them-
selves from Emgann and the others. More accurately, the activists have chosen to explore 
new ways of action, keeping in mind that, as explained by Florence Johsua, new ways of 
being an activist have been found within older militant habits (Johsua, 201116). 
Starting from September 2015, with regional elections on the horizon, the activists 
have disinvested themselves from Dibab to prioritize the election campaign. Engaged on 
 
16 “C'est en effet au sein d'un ancien militantisme que se sont inventées de nouvelles manières d'être mili-
tant" [ "it is indeed within an old activism that new ways of being an activist have been invented" ] (Johsua, 
2015 : 19). 
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four distinct campaigns a minima in favor of the autonomy of Brittany, they switched 
from the position of comrades to the position of opponents within the political arena. 
This dialectical tension between associative and partisan engagement also expressed a 
feeling of commitment to the political party that Dibab as a platform, even though rep-
resenting an attractive political outlet, had not managed to generate in such an intensive 
way. The activists have thus appropriated the electoral game without hesitating to criti-
cize its rules, particularly the double ballot rule. Participation in the elections was nothing 
new for the former Emgann members who already presented candidates to several local 
elections, allying themselves to parties which are organized at the scale of the state, such 
as the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR) or EÉLV. 
During the summer of 2015, no Dibab vote was organized. It was indeed a phase 
during which Dibab activists planned a third wave of votes expected for the beginning of 
fall and their political strategy for regional elections all at once. These elections were 
marked by a division within Breizhistance members along two political lines following the 
administrative territorial breakdown of Brittany. On the one side, Breizhistance activists 
in administrative Brittany defended a radical campaign, demanding anti-capitalism and 
independence with the list “Bretagne en Luttes – Breizh O Stourm” (“Brittany in 
Struggles”). On the other side, activists who run the election in the department of Loire-
Atlantique (administratively in the region of Pays de la Loire) chose to integrate a center 
left-wing list called “Choisir nos Régions et réunifier la Bretagne” (“choose our regions 
and reunify Brittany”), led by a former EÉLV member. From this, a real dilemma within 
revolutionary independence campaigners can be pointed out: if some of them place their 
will to reunify the territory before their social beliefs and regular militant methods, 
others are more uncomfortable with the idea of sweeping radical markers under the 
carpet. 
Let us here underline the fact that even though the platform was progressively 
decommissioned by its initiators, all divided into different political unit, including within 
Breizhistance itself, there were still dynamics of affective economy and militant 
commitment at work among Dibab activists. Indeed, the social configuration of militant 
groups in the Emsav allowed them to transfer their political competences to other 
spheres like the electoral one, hence benefiting from alternative sources of gratification. 
This configuration change is minor when we consider the fact that Dibab members, and 
especially Breizhistance activists were still part of the same community afterwards, 
where the same commitment mechanisms continued to be impulsed: “emotional 
commitment becomes commitment to a set of social relationships. The individual 
commits himself to the group as his primary set of relations; his loyalty and allegiance 
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are offered to all the members of the group, who together comprise a community" (Moss 
Kanter, 1972 : 72). 
Questioned on their next militant perspectives, a Dibab member, ex-Emgann, asked 
themselves : “maybe we're gonna quit this side which is a little formal, a little of democ-
racy, of responsibility and stuff, to be in a clash that might take a little more direct form”. 
He refered to a social movement then happening in France, in which many former Dibab 
campaigners were involved. The mobilization against the so-called “Loi Travail17” thus 
allowed the left-wing Breton activists to get back in touch with the tradition of national-
itarian Breton left. 
The radical left was not the only fringe of the Emsav to envisage confrontation with 
the authorities. In the second half of 2013, a popular movement emerged in Brittany 
marked by its heterogeneous aspect, reuniting business leaders and workers threatened 
by unemployment, political parties of the right and the left: the Bonnets Rouges (“Red 
Capes”) movement. The latter was notable for its actions of degradation and sabotage 
on highway gates aiming at withdrawing a special tax for trucks engendering, sometimes 
violent confrontations with the police (Rabier, 2015). Using methods borrowing from the 
first and the second repertories of contention18 typologized by Charles Tilly (Tilly, 1984) 
the mobilization quickly merged with nationalitarian regionalism. Resorting to practices 
usually classified as pre-modern is not new for nationalitarian - and social - movements, 
as has been shown by Xabier Itçaina (Itçaina, 2012) in his study of the Basque movement. 
The “reuse of seemingly obsolete forms of contention within modern collective action” 
(Favretto and Itçaina, 2017 : 4-5) is interesting to the extent that it invites us to pay at-
tention to phenomena of continuity within repertories of contention. 
Although a minority of Dibab activists I interviewed disapproved of the lack of ideo-
logical clarity within the Bonnets Rouges movement, UDB and above all Breizhistance 
campaigners participated in the demonstrations even though their voice remained a 
marginal one within the Bonnets Rouges. 
Furthermore, the older actors of the independence movement are not the only ones 
to evoke the social memory of violent action and of its repression in Brittany. Younger 
activists from recently born left-wing organizations of the Emsav also refer to it. In effect, 
the group of young activists Dispac’h (“revolution”), created in March 2018, regularly 
publishes ephemerides on its Facebook page to commemorate the past. Attacks 
 
17 This law changing the general working conditions in France was carried by minister of Labour Myriam El 
Khomri, under the François Hollande presidency, and met a fierce opposition. 
18 This is particularly striking in the case of the Bonnets Rouges mobilization, which carried a localized com-
ponent reminding us of the pre-modern rural mobilizations: the red cape refers for instance to the 1675 
“Papier timbré” revolt in Brittany, during which Breton farmers refused to pay a tax on stamped paper. 
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committed by the ARB as well as the trials of presumed ARB members are mentioned. A 
non-negligeable part of Dispac'h activists know about the history of Dibab as well as the 
history of the ARB. Two of them also participated in Dibab. When national radio station 
France Inter requested the older militant generation’s opinion regarding the emergence 
of a new group at the radical left, the view of a former Emgann spokesman was solicited, 
and the report was entitled “the return of Breton independence movement19”. But former 
Emgann, Breizhistance or Dispac'h activists are not the only ones who cultivate the 
memory of the ARB. In effect, a member of EÉLV and Dibab tells us: “before you had the 
bombs, and the bombs would impose something20”. 
Without elaborating rough separations ‒ violent/non-violent action, institutional/pro-
test action ‒ on categories that appear to be porous and built by their contexts, one can 
conclude with Sidney Tarrow that conventional and heterodox forms of collective action 
generally progress in parallel (Tarrow in Sommier, 2013), as they are drawn by fluctuating 
moral economies of protests. It is in the actors’ trajectories and their ways of performing 
them that this continuum is embodied. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
  
Retrainings in militant trajectories do not obey to a monocausal logic. Although 
Breizhistance activists within Dibab have benefited from gratifications produced by a 
renewed repertoire centered on citizen participation, they have also experienced its 
specific access costs. Indeed, the political socialization of my informants is constituted of 
revolutionary and pro-independence discourses, confining them to a certain marginality 
in the Breton political field. The decline of the social acceptability of nationalitarian 
violence after the Quévert bombing is undeniable. However, one cannot safely assume 
that the activists went from a radical discourse encouraging political violence to a 
depoliticized lexicon which would be easier to combine with the state institutions. As 
previously noted, militant careers are read as a continuum by the activists. Strategies of 
tinkering with coherence are thus to be especially analyzed for they disclose a lot about 
the difficulties to adapt oneself to participatory practices when one is not socialized to 
it. 
Moreover, repertorial shift is not a synonym for deconflictualization. Being 
multipositioned in the militant space is for the activists a way of reducing dissonances 
 
19“Le retour de l’indépendantisme breton”, Le Zoom, radio programme France Inter, 06/07/18. 
20 “Avant, tu avais les bombes, et les bombes, ça imposait quelque chose”. 
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created by the organizational deradicalization of the Breton movement at the turn of the 
2000’s. Informants can therefore confine their revolutionary and pro-independence 
thoughts in certain militant spaces, without necessarily reneging them. Furthermore, this 
game on different ranges of collective action invites us to analyze the Emsav repertoire 
as a whole unit. 
For instance, the 2013 Bonnets Rouges movement has shown that new forms of 
conflict politics are able to resurrect in each movement. The Breton movement can hence 
be considered as an abeyance organization (Taylor, 1989). In that perspective, it appears 
useful to question the appropriation of participation by activists that the effects of 
political violence made their marks on the long term. Therefore, I tried to understand 
how their ideological convictions were articulated with the practice of voting by drawing 
a rough cartography of the different militant spaces they invested in. Far from being a 
mere anecdote, the story of Dibab thereby partially illustrates repertorial recompositions 
of the early 21st century Breton movement. 
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